Introduction: The Mathura Rape Case and Its Jurisprudential Significance
In the Indian criminal jurisprudence system, the Mathura rape case (Tukaram and Another v. State of Maharashtra, 1979)[1] is a landmark case that has helped to expose the systemic failures in the protection of women’s rights under the legal framework present in the 1970s. To summarize, Mathura was a young tribal girl who had been raped in custody by two policemen in the precincts of a police station, which culminated in a Supreme Court judgment of acquittal. The case caused national uproar, giving birth to far-reaching legal reforms affecting women’s rights.
The judgment was criticized for clinging to outdated notions of consent; according to the Court, Mathura’s passive submission through fear or lack of resistance was not sufficiently contrary to a claim of consent so as to render her the victim of the crime of rape, as defined in Section 375 of the IPC (now Section 69 of the BNSS). Such reasoning smacked of a supreme patriarchal interpretation of consent, as it failed even to consider that the really crucial factor in determining consent is the inherent power imbalance that exists between a victim and the state authorities responsible for protecting her. Within the backlash against that verdict was a powerful impetus for the feminist movement for legal reform, which ultimately led to the amendments of criminal rape laws in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983, tightening the definitions of custodial rape, and placing the burden of proof in certain cases.
The case is still very relevant today, especially considering the recent amendments to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNSS), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) meant to transform the criminal justice system in India. An analytical study of Tukaram using the FIRAC (Facts, Issues, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion) technique highlights not only its jurisprudential shortcomings but also the significant manner in which its legacy is casting its weight in today’s legal reforms, especially in regard to custodial sexual violence and the definition of consent.
Case Study: FIRAC Analysis of Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra
Facts of the Case
In 1972, such an incident which could severely plague the image of the Indian Legal System in the public eyes really was the incident in Mathura where a 16 Tribal Girl was called to Desai Ganj Police Station in Maharashtra along with her brother on a trivial complaint lodged by her employer. This was followed by a brutal denial of justice when Mathura was supposedly raped at the hands of two policemen of the rank of Constable Ganpat and Head Constable Tukaram, right within the establishment where she was supposed to find sanctuary.
The trial court shockingly acquitted the accused, but the Bombay High Court, recognizing the grave injustice, reversed the decision and convicted them all over again. In a ruling, however, which proved to be quite contentious, the conviction was overruled by the Supreme Court in 1979, claiming most absurdly that Mathura had “consented” to the sexual act. Besides, the court quoted an absence of visible injuries or of resistance, ignoring the huge power imbalance and terrifying reality of custodial rape.
Such a verdict created national uproar and sparked sweeping legal reform, including amendments to rape laws in India. And yet this is but one echoing reminder that even the justice system itself fails often and regularly its vulnerable victims, particularly those hailing from among Indian marginalized communities. Mathura’s sufferings encompass the struggle of gender and caste along with institutional oppression: a battle that has still not found justice.
Issues Raised
- Whether passive submission constitutes consent under Section 375 IPC (now Section 63 BNS)
- Whether power dynamics in custodial situations were properly considered
- Whether burden of proof was appropriately placed under Section 114A of Evidence Act (now Section 53(3) BSA)
Legal Rules Applied
In Tukaram and Another vs State of Maharashtra (Mathura Rape Case)[2], the Supreme Court took a regressive and narrow approach to the interpretation of section 375 of the Indian Penal Code in regard to the concept of consent. It held that the absence of visible injuries upon the victim’s body and the absence of any evidence of physical resistance would tantamount to not being able to draw a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the act was non-consensual. The judgment complemented a problematic judicial tendency to equate consent with the absence of resistance and to demand trauma corroboration—an expectation that could be viewed not only as archaic but also as grievously insensitive to the realities of custodial sexual assault.
Despite the backdrop of a fundamentally skewed balance of power in custodial settings, where coercion could be subtle yet overwhelming, the ruling seemed to have invertedly overemphasized the presumption of innocence of the accused. Instead of recognizing the exceptional vulnerability of the victim, an under-age tribal girl confined inside a police station, it demanded that this helpless victim prove her non-consent, beyond reasonable doubt. Such an inordinate evidentiary expectation blatantly disregarded the contextual constraints and psychological pressures imposed on victims in such situations, consequently setting the way for an acquittal that subverted the very rationale of rape law, namely, the protection of bodily integrity and dignity, especially of women under state custody.
Analysis
“What’s this matter of protecting our sanctity and dignity? Is our dignity only to be asserted in the face of grievous bodily harm and irreparable injury? Dignity must also be defended from all sorts of indignities that comprise harassment or verbal cruelty.” The rank injustice that affliction with diminished memories brings forth is to speak of offences incompleting some-degree of ineffective resistance or intimidation.
The Court, in the Tukaram and Another v State of Maharashtra decision, had an unimaginatively outdated view of consent as perceived under Section 375 of the IPC, 1860. The absence of physical injuries was equated with consent, with no consideration given to the fact that a custodial setting would naturally create the power equation. These metrics are oblivious to the fact that consent, in a real sense, must stand for voluntary agreement which ultimately dissents under coercive power exercised by the police against the victim. The decision failed to understand that in such an environment, one does not have free will; one submits to what the authorities order out of fear, anxiety, or helplessness.
Demanding the prosecution prove every possible form of non-consent beyond a reasonable doubt put an impossible burden on the victim. The forensics of consent in criminal cases are treated with great reverence under the CrPC, yet, that very reverence was also buffeted here without paying heed to the victim’s vulnerability while in custody of the state. Embedding the defence to account for any injuries suffered or not suffered was misplaced, which unjustly laid an evaluative standard that has now been corrected by several legislative initiatives.
The aggrieved indignation grew in the aftermath to warrant the being of critical amendments through the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1983, wherewith Sections 376(2)(a), IPC was relied upon and later redrafted to become Section 64(2)(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, maintaining explicitness with custodial rape into the realms of an offence. The erstwhile Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, but now Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, has meanwhile been introduced to create a presumption of absence of consent regarding which the burden lies upon the accused.
More sympathetic provisions are contained in the BNSS, like statements by the victim being recorded in a friendly way (Section 193) and time-bound investigations (Section 269), which were glaringly absent in the Mathura judgment. The eventualities, therefore, exposed profound system-aided insensitivities that became a watershed moment for feminist legal reconstruction, showing that mere prescription is not enough without therapeutic and contextually sensitive interpretation.
Relevance of Tukaram in the Context of BNSS (2023)
Narrow Interpretation of Consent under Section 63 of the BNS
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Tukaram and Another v State of Maharashtra[3] was based on a narrow and formalistic construction of law concerning rape. The Court relied upon the Section 375 of the IPC, now re-situated into Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and equated absence of physical injuries or outward resistance to consent, ignoring the fact that consent should be free, voluntary, and affirmative. The entire apparent submissiveness in a custodial situation would have arisen out of fear or helplessness and not real consent because the person is under detention. It did not consider the aspect of power imbalance and the intrinsic coercive environment of police custody which inherently distorts the meaning of consent in law.
Evidentiary Burden and Presumption of Innocence
The court was not very wise in applying the presumption of innocence rigidly to ensure the prosecution prove non-consent beyond reasonable doubt. It is true that this is a principle that lies at the heart of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023- BNSS); still, that reality of custodial sexual assault faded away while applying this principle in context of the Mathura case. Again, absence of injuries does not rule out rape; a lot of victims have actually refrained from fighting back out of fear or in a state of trauma, especially when the perpetrators are police officers. Such an approach exonerating the accused rests on a lot of archaic premises and, in fact, discredits survivor testimony.
Legislative Response and Structural Reforms
The public ire regarding the verdict brought about serious changes. The Criminal Laws Amendment Act, 1983 incorporated Section 376(2)(a) into the IPC to punish custodial rape, which is now found in Section 64(2)(a) of the BNS, thereby laying emphasis on the aggravated nature of sexual violence perpetrated by those in authority over the vulnerable. The Indian Evidence Act of 1872, too, was amended by inserting a new Section 114A, which creates a presumption against consent in custodial rape cases; once intercourse is proved, it is deemed that consent was not there. The said provision was retained and updated under Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), that very much shifts the burden on the accused to show that consent was given and rightfully addresses the evidentiary gaps that were laid bare in Mathura.
Procedural Advancements under BNSS
The BNSS is said to usher in procedural safeguards for victims of sexual violence. The gist of Section 193 BNSS is to mandate that the statement by the victim is to be recorded by a female police officer. Further, Section 269 BNSS provides time-bound period for investigations and trial in cases pertaining to sexual offences. They seem to show the changing legal consciousness movement towards victim dignity in procedure sensibility and accountability. The Mathura judgment, in contrast, was procedurally vacuous in that it did not embed such provisions and thus turned out to be justice-denying.
It reminds us all how substantive and procedural law must be read through the glasses of social context and constitutional morality. The case revealed systemic insensitivity to the problem of sexual violence and abuse of custodial power. Although legislative reforms have corrected many of these deficiencies through the BNS, BNSS, and BSA, the shadow of Mathura lurks, reminding us that adjudication must be victim-centric and context-aware. Justice is not just a matter of legal technicalities; it requires a jurisprudence that is empathetic, equitable, and responsive to structural vulnerabilities.
Conclusion: Tukaram as a Catalyst for Legal Evolution
This Mathura rape case is a landmark moment in the criminal justice history of India-not for the justice it rendered but for the injustice it exposed. It forced the legal as well as civil society to reckon with the other disturbing voids in the understanding and response of law to sexual violence, especially in custody. The flawed reasoning of the Supreme Court in favoring the purely formalistic interpretation of consent ignored the oppressive power dynamics at play. It started a movement for statutory reform. The amendments brought in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983, and this BNS, BNSS, and BSA currently bring significant strides toward victim-sensitive jurisprudence.
But law cannot solve systemic injustice. The Mathura event emphasized that the working of laws has to adapt to change along with changes in the statute. There is no meaningful justice without judicial sensibility, contextual reading, and a deeper understanding of consent, especially regarding situations of control by the state. Codifying custodial rape under BNS, presumptive evidential backing under the BSA, and procedural safeguards afforded by the BNSS designate a legal structure that is strong and survivor-centric. Yet their true strength lies in the consistency through which they are enforceable in an empathetic manner.
Re-examining Mathura with a modern legal streak, it is clear that the legacy of the case still reverberates through and thus inspires discourse on gender justice, state accountability, and institutional reform. It reminds the world that justice is not static-it has to be pushed around by awareness in society, responsiveness in legislation, and integrity in the judiciary. The shift from Mathura to the BNSS epoch is not merely a change in the avenue of legal evolution; rather, it asks never to let silence, power, or procedure silence the voice of the survivor.
[1] Tukaram and Ors. v The State of Maharashtra AIR 1979, SC 185
[2] Tukaram and Ors. v The State of Maharashtra AIR 1979, SC 185
[3] Tukaram and Ors. v The State of Maharashtra AIR 1979, SC 185
Author: Vaibhav Bansal is a 2nd Year B.A.LL.B (Hons.) student at National Law University and Judicial Academy, Assam
