Introduction
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have become central to modern private international law, especially as cross-border transactions and global mobility continue to grow. India addresses these questions through a structured statutory framework embedded in Sections 13, 14, and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Together, these provisions define when a foreign judgment may be treated as conclusive, how presumptions of validity operate, and under what circumstances enforcement is permissible. Their design reflects a deliberate balance between the need to respect the judicial acts of other states and the responsibility to safeguard domestic legal principles.
This paper analyses the statutory structure and doctrinal evolution governing foreign judgments in India, highlighting how legislation and jurisprudence together create a system that is both internationally engaged and domestically protective.
Statutory Framework Under The Code Of Civil Procedure
India has a statutory scheme that regulates foreign judgment which is largely influenced by the Sections 13, 14 and 44a of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The provisions offer the substantive requirements as well as the procedural mechanisms by which the foreign judgments may be recognized and enforced.
They represent a systematic effort to compromise between international co-operation and the imperative to maintain jurisdictional integrity, fairness and public policy in the domestic system. All these provisions combined form a complete framework according to which the courts should decide when such a judgment can be regarded as conclusive, how the presumptions of validity are to be treated, and in which cases the enforcement can take place.[1]
Section 13 establishes the substantive rule of the conclusiveness of the foreign judgments. It says that the foreign judgment is final on any point directly determined upon between the same parties, with exception of six cases. This rule actually establishes the point of recognition so that a foreign judgment will be binding unless it is within one of the listed exceptions.
The section makes law of historic common law principles, so that even during the time courts revere the foreign judgment, they do not receive those that breach basic procedural or jurisdictional principles. The attention is directed to safeguarding parties against flawed decisions and at the same time facilitate efficiency in cross-border dispute resolution.
Section 13 has six exceptions which are core to the limits of conclusivity. Clause (a) excludes the judgment that has not been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. The competence used here is based on not just laws of the foreign court but also jurisdictional standards accepted by the Indian law.
The judgment made cannot be considered to be final in case the defendant was not duly placed under the jurisdiction through presence and/or contract and/or voluntary participation. Clause (b) omits judgments not based on the merits of the case. This exception applies to decisions made on purely technical and procedural default basis or ex parte basis which have not been assessed substantively.
Clause (c) prohibits judgments based on erroneous conceptions of international law or judgment denying Indian law where they are applicable[2]. This prevents the foreign courts to intrude in using their own legal standards of things that were inherently related to Indian law.[3]
Clause (d) omits judgments that are made through fraud regardless of whether such fraud is based on jurisdictional or the question involved in the case. Fraud as an insult to justice invalidates the validity of any court decision. Clause (e) is applicable in cases of judgments of breach of natural justice.
An arbiter who renders a judgment without giving reasonable notice, a fair hearing, or even an arbiter assembling the case of both sides would be regarded as falling into this exception. Lastly, clause (f) does not include claims that go against Indian public policy. This exception is so that foreign judgments are not given preference in the event that they violate the moral, social or legal principles of India, and the interpretation of public policy is quite strict by the courts to provide that it is not necessary to interfere with international comity.[4]
Section 14 is a supplement to Section 13; it gives a procedural presumption in favour of foreign judgment. According to it, the court will assume that when a certified copy of a foreign judgment is presented, the judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. It is an assumption that is not final and can be refuted by the jurisdiction party.
The provision makes recognition easier by putting the first burden on the party requiring the judgment. However it has got protection mechanisms as the opposing party can prove the flaws in the jurisdiction or procedural fairness.[5] This balance guarantees efficiency as well as equity when it comes to the treatment of foreign decisions.[6]
Section 44A of the Code is also concerned with the execution of the foreign judgments in India, where the decrees of so-called reciprocating territories can be executed as those of local courts. Reciprocating territories are informed by the Central Government by means of official messages and the decrees of these jurisdictions can be presented in the courts of Indian districts directly in order to be executed.
Nevertheless, the judgment debtor has the right to continue objections under Section 13 without any substantive safeguard.[7] Reciprocity concept enhances mutual respect among countries and harmonize with the implementation processes with the principle of giving equal treatment to judicial decision of other states.[8]
The duality of recognition and enforcement is in the relationship between domestic decrees and foreign decrees. Section 13 does not require a foreign judgment to be enforced with execution to be considered conclusive. Recognition means the legal validity and legal binding effect of the judgment whereas enforcement is execution of the judgment by the court machinery.
Non-reciprocating territories decree judgments need the judgment creditor to initiate a new suit on the basis of the foreign judgment in India to receive an executable decree. Such a difference secures the domestic procedural independence and still allows parties to turn to foreign adjudications.[9]
Judicial Interpretation And Doctrinal Development
One of the earliest and most influential cases is Satya v. Teja Singh (1975)[10], the Supreme Court further developed the doctrine by refusing to recognize a foreign divorce decree obtained in circumstances that violated principles of natural justice and good faith. The Court stressed that comity cannot be invoked to legitimize judgments secured through fraud or unfair procedure.
This decision reinforced that while international cooperation is desirable, it cannot override the fundamental requirement that judgments be obtained through processes that meet minimum standards of fairness.
Similary the case of Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi (1991)[11] which involved a Hindu couple married in India in 1975 separated in 1978. The husband obtained a divorce decree from a Missouri court by fraudulently claiming 90-day residence and on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage.” He then remarried, leading to a bigamy complaint.
The Supreme Court held the foreign divorce unenforceable in India as the Missouri court lacked jurisdiction under the Hindu Marriage Act and granted divorce on a ground unavailable under Indian law. The Court established landmark rules requiring foreign matrimonial judgments to comply with Indian matrimonial law for recognition, protecting against convenient forum shopping.
Another significant contribution came in International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd. (2001)[12], where the Supreme Court examined the meaning of a judgment “on the merits” under Section 13(b). The Court held that decisions based solely on procedural grounds or defaults cannot be treated as conclusive. This clarification strengthened doctrinal coherence by affirming that conclusiveness depends on a substantive evaluation of the dispute, not merely on formal compliance or procedural mechanisms.
Across these cases, courts have sought to balance sovereignty with comity. Sovereignty requires that domestic courts retain control over which foreign judgments will be recognized, especially when jurisdiction or procedural fairness is questionable.
Comity, on the other hand, acknowledges the need to respect foreign courts to promote stability in cross-border transactions. Indian courts have taken a middle path, granting recognition where procedures meet fairness standards but refusing enforcement where judgments threaten domestic policy or constitutional norms.[13]
The concept of conclusiveness has drawn sustained judicial attention. Courts consistently hold that conclusiveness is conditional rather than absolute, foreign judgments are conclusive only when they do not fall within Section 13(a) to (f). This doctrinal structure acts as a filter, ensuring that recognition is grounded in fairness, jurisdictional competence, and substantive adjudication. Public policy has been treated as a last-resort exception, invoked sparingly and only in cases where enforcement would undermine basic legal norms.[14]
Comparatively, Indian courts follow a pattern broadly consistent with English and American precedents, though with certain distinctive emphases. English courts have historically applied the doctrine of obligation, focusing on whether the defendant submitted to jurisdiction.
American courts rely more on due process and reciprocity. Indian jurisprudence mirrors these standards but incorporates statutory grounds that explicitly codify exceptions, creating greater certainty. The Indian approach, therefore, blends common law principles with statutory precision, reflecting both international influences and domestic priorities.
Conclusion
The Indian approach to foreign judgments demonstrates a careful synthesis of statutory clarity and judicial refinement. Sections 13, 14, and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure establish a coherent framework that allows foreign judgments to operate within the domestic legal system while maintaining firm boundaries grounded in fairness, jurisdiction, and public policy. Courts have consistently reaffirmed that recognition is not automatic but conditional, dependent on compliance with principles that protect the integrity of Indian adjudication.
Overall, the evolving doctrine reflects a balanced posture: India supports international cooperation but preserves its legal autonomy. The framework strikes a workable compromise, promoting certainty in cross-border dispute resolution while ensuring that domestic courts remain vigilant guardians of procedural fairness and substantive justice. This alignment of legislative provisions and judicial principles gives the system both stability and adaptability.
[1] Takwani, C.K. (2020). Civil Procedure: With Limitation Act, 1963 (9th ed.). Lucknow: Eastern Book Company.
[2] Abhishek Gandhi, Section 13 CPC: Foreign Judgments and Their Enforceability in India, Dr. Abhishek Gandhi – Legal Blog (2025), https://advocategandhi.com/section-13-cpc-foreign-judgments-and-their-enforceability-in-india/.
[3]Code of Civil Procedure, § 13, Act No. 5 of 1908 (India).
[4] Ibid.
[5]Presumption as to Foreign Judgments, SS Law Codes (2025), https://sslawcodes.com/presumption-as-to-foreign-judgments/.
[6]Code of Civil Procedure, § 14, Act No. 5 of 1908 (India).
[7]Foreign Decree – Enforceability and Its Amplitude Over a Period of Time, Argus Partners, https://www.argus-p.com/papers-publications/thought-paper/foreign-decree-enforceability-and-its-amplitude-over-a-period-of-time/.
[8]Code of Civil Procedure, § 44A, Act No. 5 of 1908 (India).
[9]Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in India, Lexology – Global Practice Guides (2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=36daf3c7-cd94-4cb0-8ba8-3702391e24ca.
[10] Satya v. Teja Singh, (1975) 1 SCC 120
[11] of Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi , 1991 SCC (3) 451
[12] International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265
[13] William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1283 (2016), https://columbialawreview.org/content/international-comity-in-american-law/.
[14]Raj Rajendra Sardar Maloji Marsingh Rao Shitole v. Sri Shankar Saran and Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1737 (Supreme Court of India).
Author Name– Vaibhav Bansal, a third-year student pursuing B.A., LL.B (Hons.) from National Law University and Judicial Academy, Assam
