What is religion to one is superstition to another
~ Chief Justice Latham of Australia
India is the cradle of several religions, including Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism. Religious traditions and beliefs are deeply ingrained in Indian society. The right to religious freedom was expressly mentioned by the Indian Constitution’s founders in Part III, which covers basic rights, in recognition of this cultural fabric. Citizens are allowed to freely practise, profess, and spread their religion under this clause (Art 25 of the Constitution of India).
It is crucial to remember, nevertheless, that this fundamental right is not superior to all other rights. Reasonable limitations apply, such as those based on morality, public health, and order. These limitations make sure that the right to practise one’s religion does not conflict with the rights, welfare, or social order of others.
To fully realize and enjoy this right, it is essential to clarify the scope of the term “practice” as outlined in Article 25 of the Constitution. In a democratic society, no right is absolute, and thus the boundaries of religious practice must be carefully defined. This brings us to a critical analysis: should the extent of “practice” protected under the Constitution be determined by constitutional values or by religious doctrines and traditions?
Determining the answer to this question involves a nuanced understanding of both constitutional principles and religious practices. Constitutional values emphasize equality, justice, and individual freedoms, which sometimes may conflict with traditional religious practices that might not align with contemporary egalitarian norms. Therefore, the judiciary often faces the challenge of balancing respect for religious practices with the overarching constitutional mandate to protect individual rights and maintain social harmony. It can be seen from the recent ruling of the Madras High Court in the case of P. Navin v. Indian Young Lawyers Association(2024), where the court tilted more in favour of the social practice of rolling over used banana leaves instead of prioritizing constitutional principles. This not only shows the reluctance on the part of the judiciary to take a step forward in eliminating derogatory practices but also demonstrates how constitutional values are reduced to moral notions that may not be enforced when there is a conflict between traditional practices and constitutional principles.
In the later stages, this blog will briefly discuss the constitutional interpretation of essential religious practices in various judicial cases, the need to balance rights with reasonable restrictions, and the way forward.
Constitutional values and religious practices
Articles 25-28 of the Indian Constitution address the freedom of religion. Specifically, Article 25 guarantees the freedom to profess, practice, and propagate religion, subject to reasonable restrictions such as public order, health, and morality.
In the case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India, the dissenting opinion emphasized that “Religion is a matter of faith, not logic. Courts cannot prioritize an egalitarian approach over practices integral to a religion. The Constitution allows followers of every religion to adhere to their beliefs and traditions. It assures that believers’ ways of life are protected and cannot be challenged, even if they seem outdated to others. This protection exists because faith forms the core of religious consciousness, which unites believers. The Constitution aims to safeguard and preserve each religion’s beliefs under Article 25.”
However, in a democratic society, the supreme law is the Constitution itself. If any religious practice contradicts the fundamental principles of the Constitution, it cannot be deemed valid. This raises the critical question: What practices does Article 25 protect?
The Supreme Court, in the case of The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, held that Article 25 protects those practices that are considered essential by the religion itself. However, in the case of Durga Prasad Committee (Ajmer),1961, it was pointed out that the protection under Article 25 is limited to essential religious practices only.
The term “Essential Religious Practices” has not been defined anywhere in the Indian Constitution, and its determination has been inconsistent, depending on the interpretation of judges. This inconsistency has led to confusion among the legal fraternity.
In the recent P. Navin V. Indian Young Lawyers Association, the petitioner approached the Madras High Court via a writ petition to reinstate the ritual of Angapradakshinam (rolling over banana leaves on which devotees of Sri Sadasiva had taken food) on the Saint’s Jeeva Samadhi day, a practice that had been discontinued since 2015. The court, while assessing the practice as an essential religious practice, considered its historical significance and the community’s belief in its necessity. It drew inspiration from ancient Hindu scriptures and the Mahabharata. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner, allowing the practice, as it was deemed to be well protected under Article 25 of the Constitution. However, questions arise about whether such a practice aligns with constitutional principles. Should such a public act be granted protection as part of privacy? Does rolling on leaves used for food meet the health restrictions under Article 25?
Although the judiciary has often declared whether a particular practice is essential, the absence of a clear doctrine has made these determinations subjective. In the case of Gram Sabha of Village Battis Shirala V. Union of India & ors., the worship of a live cobra on Nag Panchami was not held to be essential because neither religious texts permitted it nor did the Constitution, as it could endanger lives. In Mohd. Ismail Faruqui V. Union of India, the court observed that while prayer is an essential practice under Islam, doing so in a mosque is not, unless the place has specific religious significance.
In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, the prohibition on the entry of women of menstrual age into the Sabarimala temple was removed by the High Court, observing that such a practice is derogatory to a specific gender and violates Article 14 of the Constitution. However, this case is under review in the Supreme Court, and other related religious issues, such as the entry of women into mosques and female genital mutilation in the Dawoodi Bohra community, have also been clubbed together.
It is high time that the courts develop a clear principle regarding which practices should be granted protection under Article 25 of the Constitution. The term “essential religious practice” needs to be explained in alignment with constitutional values to protect the larger interests of the people. Practices that infringe upon the fundamental rights of other individuals should not be permitted under the guise of religion, in order to maintain the unity and integrity of the nation and to preserve harmony among individuals.
Social barriers between people that are reinforced by religious beliefs must be removed. Whether an activity is considered an important religious practice should only be decided by the Constitution. By doing this, we can make sure that the behaviours covered by Article 25 don’t conflict with the core principles and rights outlined in the Constitution.
Conclusion
The definition of “Essential Religious Practices” (ERP) under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution has to be made clearer and more consistent in order to achieve a balance between religious freedom and constitutional duties. The subjective judicial rulings and legal uncertainties resulting from the ambiguity surrounding ERPs underscore the need for a systematic strategy grounded on constitutional principles.
A thorough analysis reveals that, notwithstanding Article 25’s efforts to protect religious practices, these protections cannot supersede other fundamental rights. Religious freedom shouldn’t be a cover for behaviour that jeopardises public health, morality, or order. Instead, the judge should ensure that religious activities adhere to the core principles of equality, justice, and individual freedom that are enshrined in the constitution.
The judiciary has to develop a precise theory that defines the scope of ERPs in a way that respects religious traditions and individual rights. This idea should prevent the misuse of religious freedom to justify harmful actions by highlighting the fact that any action that violates constitutional values cannot be justified.
By interpreting ERPs in light of constitutional principles, the courts can protect religious diversity and the general welfare of society. By helping to break down social boundaries and promote harmony and unity among people, this approach will ensure that religious activities have a positive effect on the nation’s social fabric.
In conclusion, the decision of ERPs should be guided by constitutional principles to ensure that the right to religious freedom is exercised responsibly and peacefully within the confines of Indian democracy. This balance is essential to maintaining the integrity of the nation and protecting each person’s rights and freedoms. Rather than overemphasizing the historical aspects when assessing any practice as an Essential Religious Practice (ERP), it is high time for the judiciary to consider the current significance of such practices, along with constitutional values and the guiding principles of natural justice. The case of P. Navin v. Indian Young Lawyers Association should serve as a guide to avoid errors in evaluating the question of ERPs.
Author: Rajarshi Dwivedi is BALLB student at Presidency University, Bengaluru.
