Abstract
The emergence of “digital arrest” — a form of cybercrime where individuals are deceived into believing they have been detained by law enforcement agencies through online intimidation — has raised new challenges for privacy, cyber law, and constitutional governance in India. This article explores the legal vacuum surrounding digital arrest, its implications for the constitutional right to privacy, and the necessity of an evolved legal framework under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Using key judicial precedents and statutory references, the paper situates digital arrest within the intersection of technology, privacy, and state accountability.
I. Introduction
In recent years, India has witnessed an alarming rise in cases of “digital arrest,” a form of cyber extortion in which scammers impersonate law enforcement officers and coerce victims into remaining under virtual “custody.” Victims are typically contacted through calls or video chats allegedly from agencies such as the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB). They are shown forged warrants or identification cards and are compelled to stay visible on camera for hours or even days under the threat of legal action.
While this phenomenon has no legal basis, it raises critical questions about the right to privacy, due process, and the digital vulnerabilities of citizens. Digital arrest represents not merely a cybercrime but a deeper erosion of constitutional safeguards in the digital age.
II. Understanding Digital Arrest
Digital arrest is not a term recognized under Indian law. Unlike a lawful arrest defined under Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), a digital arrest lacks state authorization, procedural safeguards, and physical detention. It is, in essence, an act of cyber coercion — a manipulation of identity, authority, and fear.
Victims are often blackmailed into transferring money, sharing personal data, or complying with illegal demands. In 2024, several reports from the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) revealed a sharp increase in such cases, particularly targeting educated professionals and non-resident Indians.
The act of impersonating a public servant is punishable under Section 170 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and extortion through fear of injury is covered under Section 383 IPC. When combined with electronic communication, these offences attract penalties under Sections 66D and 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act).
However, these laws address the means of the crime — not the constitutional dimension it violates: the right to informational privacy and protection against unlawful deprivation of liberty.
III. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
The Indian Constitution does not explicitly enumerate the right to privacy, but it has evolved through judicial interpretation of Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The landmark judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) affirmed privacy as a fundamental right intrinsic to dignity, autonomy, and liberty.¹
In the context of digital arrest, privacy assumes a dual dimension — informational and physical. Victims are compelled to disclose sensitive information (identity proofs, bank details, biometric data) and remain under constant surveillance via digital devices. This coerced intrusion constitutes a direct assault on personal liberty and informational control.
Moreover, digital arrest violates Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of expression) and Article 19(1)(d) (freedom of movement) by instilling fear and restricting communication. The coercive surveillance involved in such acts undermines the “reasonable restrictions” framework envisaged by the Constitution.
IV. Digital Arrest as an Unlawful Deprivation of Liberty
Article 22 of the Constitution prescribes procedural safeguards for lawful arrests and detentions, ensuring that no person is deprived of liberty without due process. A digital arrest bypasses every safeguard — there is no written order, magisterial oversight, or right to legal counsel.
In DK Basu v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court established essential guidelines for arrest and detention to prevent abuse of authority.² Digital arrest, although conducted by private actors, mirrors state-like coercion without accountability. It mimics the form of law enforcement but strips away its substance.
This raises an important constitutional question: when private individuals simulate state power to deprive citizens of liberty, does the state bear any responsibility for the resulting violation of rights? Under Article 12, fundamental rights are enforceable primarily against the state, but the Supreme Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan extended constitutional obligations to private entities through positive state duties.³By analogy, failure to prevent or respond effectively to digital arrest incidents could constitute a breach of the state’s duty to protect fundamental rights in cyberspace.
V. The Privacy Dimension in the Digital Age
The Puttaswamy judgment recognized informational privacy as a key subset of the right to privacy, emphasizing that individuals have control over their personal data. In the context of digital arrest, this right is egregiously violated through forced exposure, recording, and data transfer without consent.
The judgment also warned against the disproportionate collection of personal information by both state and non-state actors.⁴The state’s failure to ensure cyber hygiene and protect citizens from impersonation crimes indirectly undermines this constitutional guarantee.
Furthermore, digital arrest often involves psychological surveillance, where victims are coerced into maintaining constant camera presence — a modern echo of Orwellian control. This aligns with the concerns raised in People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court struck down telephone tapping provisions lacking procedural safeguards.⁵ The Court held that surveillance without oversight is an affront to privacy and personal liberty — a principle equally applicable to cyber intimidation.
VI. The Role of Cyber Law and Policy
The Information Technology Act, 2000, though comprehensive, was not designed to address complex impersonation-based cyber coercion. Section 66D penalizes “cheating by personation using a computer resource,” yet enforcement remains weak. The absence of a clear definition of “digital detention” or “virtual custody” creates interpretive challenges for investigators.
The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDPA) introduces accountability for data handling but is silent on coercive data extraction through fraud. As such, digital arrest exposes a regulatory gap between privacy protection and cybercrime prevention.
Policy intervention is required in three areas:
- Legal Recognition — defining and criminalizing “digital arrest” explicitly within the IT Act framework.
- Procedural Safeguards — establishing cyber investigation protocols ensuring authenticity verification of law enforcement communication.
VII. Comparative Jurisprudence
Globally, digital arrest scams have gained notoriety, particularly in China and Singapore, where citizens have been deceived into believing they were under investigation by “Interpol” or “Chinese Police.” These countries responded with stringent cyber enforcement units and public advisories.
In contrast, India’s fragmented cyber enforcement structure — divided among the CERT-In, I4C, and state police — results in jurisdictional confusion. Learning from comparative models, India must move towards a unified digital rights enforcement authority combining cybercrime investigation and privacy oversight.
VIII. Digital Arrest and the Chilling Effect on Fundamental Rights
The threat of digital arrest extends beyond individual harm; it produces a chilling effect on citizens’ digital expression. Fear of impersonation or unauthorized surveillance can discourage people from engaging in legitimate online activities, including dissent, journalism, or whistleblowing.
This phenomenon contravenes the constitutional ethos articulated in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act for curbing online speech.⁶ If citizens fear that digital interactions could be manipulated into criminal intimidation, the Internet ceases to be a medium of freedom and becomes one of fear.
Hence, protecting citizens from digital arrest is not merely a question of cybercrime prevention — it is essential for preserving digital constitutionalism in India.
IX. The Way Forward
A multi-pronged approach is required to address the menace of digital arrest:
- Legislative Reform: Amend the IT Act to incorporate digital impersonation, coercive detention, and cyber extortion as distinct offences with higher penalties.
- Procedural Safeguards: Introduce verification mechanisms (QR-coded e-warrants, official cyber hotlines) to help citizens authenticate law enforcement communications.
- Judicial Oversight: Establish specialized cyber courts or benches with jurisdiction over digital rights violations.
- Constitutional Enforcement: Recognize privacy violations through digital arrest as actionable under Article 32 and Article 226, allowing victims to seek constitutional remedies.
Conclusion
Digital arrest represents a disturbing intersection of technology, deception, and human vulnerability. It transforms cyberspace — once celebrated as a space of freedom — into a domain of fear and manipulation. Beyond its criminality, it symbolizes a constitutional crisis in the digital era: the erosion of privacy, dignity, and liberty without physical coercion.
The judiciary’s evolving privacy jurisprudence, led by Puttaswamy, PUCL, and Shreya Singhal, provides the interpretive foundation for addressing such emerging harms. Yet, without legislative foresight and administrative vigilance, these principles risk remaining theoretical.
The recognition of digital arrest as a violation of the right to privacy is, therefore, not just a legal necessity but a constitutional imperative — ensuring that India’s digital transformation remains anchored in justice, dignity, and the rule of law.
Footnotes
- Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
- D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416.
- Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241.
- Puttaswamy, supra note 1, at 306.
- People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301.
- Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
Author Name- Abhineet Srivastava is a LL.B. (Hons.) – Second Year at the University of Allahabad
