I. Introduction
India’s courts face a backlog of over 5 crore pending cases, a level of congestion that has turned delay into a defining feature of civil litigation.¹ In response, Parliament enacted the Mediation Act, 2023, the country’s first dedicated statute for mediation.² The law seeks to divert a portion of civil disputes away from courts by encouraging pre-litigation mediation, establishing the Mediation Council of India, and granting mediated settlement agreements legal enforceability.
The promise is significant: if even a modest share of new filings are resolved at the mediation stage, long-term pressure on court dockets could reduce meaningfully. But pendency in India is not simply a procedural issue. It is driven by capacity deficits, deeply rooted litigation behaviour, and uneven adoption across institutions. This article argues that although the Mediation Act provides a modern framework, its real impact depends on three unresolved challenges: (1) the availability and distribution of trained mediators, (2) systemic reform in government litigation practices, and (3) the strength of court-level referral mechanisms.
Early evidence from state-level mediation initiatives suggests that mediation can work — but only when statutory design is matched with institutional support, adequate staffing, and incentives that favour settlement over prolonged litigation.
II. What the Act Actually Changes
The Mediation Act replaces a previously scattered landscape with a structured framework. Three components matter most for pendency.
1. Pre-Litigation Mediation (PLM)
Sections 5–7 encourage parties to attempt mediation before filing suit.³ Timelines ensure that PLM remains efficient rather than a procedural obstacle. Properly implemented, PLM can act as a first-stage filter by resolving disputes capable of consensual settlement.
2. Institutionalisation through the Mediation Council of India
Sections 31–36 establish the Mediation Council of India, responsible for accrediting mediators, registering service providers, and prescribing ethical and training norms.⁴ This replaces an uneven system of court-run mediation centres and fragmented local practices, improving consistency and professionalisation.
3. Enforceability of Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs)
Sections 18–20 make MSAs legally enforceable, with challenges limited to narrow grounds such as fraud, impersonation, or incapacity.⁵ This resolves a long-standing weakness, where enforcement often required separate litigation that undermined the efficiency benefits of mediation.
These reforms collectively create a coherent statutory architecture — but architecture alone does not reduce backlog.
III. Why the Act Alone Cannot Reduce Pendency
Three structural constraints limit the extent to which the Mediation Act can reduce India’s case burden.
A. Mediator Capacity Is Limited and Uneven
India does not yet have the mediator capacity needed for large-scale PLM. Many district courts have limited access to accredited mediators, and training programs remain ad-hoc and uneven across states.⁶ The Act provides accreditation norms but no national plan to train and deploy mediators proportionate to caseloads. Without a substantial expansion of the mediator workforce, especially outside major cities, PLM will struggle to function effectively.
B. Government Litigation Practices Remain Unchanged
Government entities remain India’s largest litigants, contributing a significant share of civil cases.⁷ Historically, officials avoid settlement because:
- multi-layered approval processes slow decision-making,
- fear of audit objections discourages compromise, and
- legal officers are rewarded for “not losing” cases, not resolving them.
Although the Act applies to government disputes, statutory obligation alone cannot overcome structural disincentives. Without a redesigned government litigation policy — with delegated settlement authority, time-bound approval mechanisms, and performance metrics that reward resolution — mediation uptake by the State will remain low.
C. Referral Culture in Courts Is Weak
Section 89 CPC empowered courts to refer disputes to ADR, but referral practices have historically been inconsistent and sparse.⁸ The Mediation Act strengthens the framework but does not mandate automatic referral of mediation-suitable disputes (e.g., small claims, commercial matters, family disputes). Without stronger referral norms and proactive judicial screening, mediation will continue to rely on individual judges rather than institutional processes.
IV. Early Evidence: Pilot Projects Reveal Both Promise and Limits
Pilot initiatives offer insight into how mediation performs in practice. In 2023, the Punjab & Haryana High Court supported a mediation drive that achieved a settlement rate of approximately 45% in selected dispute categories — including family matters and small-value civil claims.⁹ Such results show that mediation can be highly effective when judges actively screen cases and trained mediators are available.
However, these pilots also reveal inherent limitations:
- settlement success depended on active judicial leadership,
- mediators were concentrated in specific districts,
- most resolved disputes were low-complexity matters, and
- outcomes varied sharply between regions.
These experiences show that mediation has undeniable potential, but real pendency reduction depends on systematic implementation — not only on statutory design.
V. Conclusion — What Must Change for the Act to Work
The Mediation Act, 2023 is a major reform. But if the goal is meaningful pendency reduction, three systemic steps must complement the statute:
1. Build Mediator Capacity Through a National Plan
The Mediation Council should publish a district-wise training and accreditation roadmap, supported by funding mechanisms and targets for mediator availability.
2. Reform Government Litigation Policy
Government litigation should shift to mediation-first processes, with delegated settlement powers, time-bound approvals, and performance evaluations that reward early and cost-effective resolution.
3. Strengthen Referral Culture and Track Data
Courts should adopt presumptive referral frameworks for mediation-suitable dispute categories. Mediation outcomes should be integrated into the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) to enable data-driven oversight and reform.¹⁰
If implemented alongside these steps, the Mediation Act could become one of the most consequential judicial reforms in India’s recent history.
Footnotes
- National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG), Statistics of Pending Cases, https://njdg.ecourts.gov.in (accessed December 2024).
- The Mediation Act, 2023, No. 32 of 2023, Gazette of India (15 September 2023), https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2023/248775.pdf.
- Id., ss. 5–7 (Pre-Litigation Mediation mechanism).
- Id., ss. 31–36 (Mediation Council of India).
- Id., ss. 18–20 (Enforceability of Mediated Settlement Agreements).
- Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, Strengthening Mediation in India (2021), https://vidhilegalpolicy.in.
- Law Commission of India, Report No. 230: Reforms in Government Litigation (2009), https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in.
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 89.
- “Punjab & Haryana HC Mediation Drive Settles Nearly 45% of Targeted Cases,” Hindustan Times, Chandigarh Edition (2023).
- eCourts Project & NJDG, Policy Framework for Judicial Data, https://njdg.ecourts.gov.in.
Author Bio– Nishant is an independent legal writer focusing on judicial reform, dispute-resolution mechanisms, and public law.
