The Competition Commission of India (CCI), established under the Competition Act of 2002 [i]is India’s principal competition regulator. CCI was founded as part of India’s economic liberalization policies to enforce competition legislation, foster market efficiency, and combat anti-competitive conduct.
The CCI aligns India’s competition laws with global standards, centred on the Raghavan Committee’s recommendations, with the objectives of preventing anti-competitive agreements, reducing abuse of dominance, promoting healthy competition, protecting consumer interests, and ensuring free trade.
The Competition Act of 2002 succeeded The Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act of 1969[ii].
The commission is a quasi-judicial institution that advises government agencies and issues state orders to them. It plays adjudicative power by finalizing penalties and directs it to be heard further by National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).NCLAT plays a multi-jurisdictional role position as a crucial corrective forum for competition law adjudication. The Companies Act, 2013[iii], the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016 [iv]and now the Competition Act, 2002[v]
CCI Administrative Functions
- CCI acts as a market regulator by continuously monitoring market trends and developments across all sectors to identify and prevent potential anti-competitive issues.
- The Commission provides opinions and recommendations to the Central and State Governments, as well as to other statutory authorities, on competition-related policy matters and legislative changes to ensure alignment with the objectives of the Competition Act.
- Prima Facie Opinion (Section 26(1)): [vi]In the landmark case of CCI v. SAIL (2010)[vii], the Supreme Court held that when the CCI directs the Director General to investigate a matter, such direction constitutes only an administrative function of the Commission.
CCI Adjudicative Functions
• CCI may initiate inquiries suo motu or upon receipt of information or complaints concerning anti-competitive practices. For this purpose, it directs its investigative arm, the Director General, to conduct detailed investigations into alleged contraventions of the Competition Act.
• The Commission possesses the authority to declare void any agreement that causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition, including arrangements involving price-fixing, bid rigging, or market allocation.
• CCI is empowered to issue cease-and-desist orders, impose substantial monetary penalties on violators, and direct compensation to affected parties.
• CCI is not a purely judicial body, but it functions in a manner similar to other judicial bodies. Under Section 36 of the Competition Act, 2002, the Commission is vested with powers analogous to those of a civil court, including the authority to regulate its own procedure.
• Section 27 of the Competition Act, 2002 [viii]provides for orders that may be passed by the Commission after inquiry into anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position.
• Section 19 of the Competition Act, 2002 [ix]empowers the Commission to inquire into certain agreements and the dominant position of enterprises, thereby conferring adjudicatory authority upon it under the statute.
The exercise of these adjudicatory powers has been affirmed through several leading precedents. In 2013, the CCI imposed a penalty of ₹522 million (US$7.6 million) on the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) for abuse of its dominant position, holding that the IPL team ownership agreements were unfair, discriminatory, and excessively restrictive. Similarly, in the Google Android case (2020–2023)[x], the Commission imposed significant penalties on Google for abusing its dominant position in the mobile operating system market through its Play Store policies, leading to extensive scrutiny of app store commissions and related practices.
Adjudicative Vs. Administrative Function
The commission outlaw anti-competitive agreements, enterprise abuse of dominant positions, and combinations (acquisition, gaining control, and M&A) that have or are likely to have a considerable detrimental effect on competition in India.
Brahm Dutt v. Union of India (2005)[xi] is a key case relating to the Competition Act of 2002 and the operation of the Competition Commission of India (CCI). This violates both Articles 14 and 50 of the Constitution. In 2017, the government replaced the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) with theNCLAT.
The main challenge in the writ petition was that the CCI is more of a judicial body with adjudicatory powers, and that under the doctrine of separation of powers, the right to appoint members to the CCI should rest with the Chief Justice of India or any other senior Judge of a High Court. However, it should not be left to a bureaucrat or another individual nominated by the administration without consulting the courts.
Thus, the major question before the Supreme Court was whether the CCI is part of the government or the judiciary. Dismissing the challenge, the Court remarked that:
“if a judicial body is to be created as submitted on behalf of the Union of India consistent with what is said to be an international practice, it might be appropriate for the respondents to consider the creation of two separate bodies, one with the expertise that is advisory and regulatory and the other adjudicatory. This followed up by an appellate body as contemplated by the proposed amendment, can go a long way, in meeting the challenge sought to be raised in this writ petition based on the doctrine of separation of powers recognised by the constitution.”[xii]
The distinction between administrative and adjudicatory functions of the CCI is further reflected in its decision-making process, as seen in Hyundai Motors Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India & Ors., [xiii]the CCI found Hyundai in violation of Section 3(4) of the Competition Act[xiv] the CCI had based its decision solely on the opinion expressed by the Director General (DG) in his report—an investigation report—without undertaking an independent analysis of the evidence to arrive at a finding of contravention.
Similarly, in Faridabad Industries Association (FIA) v. M/s Adani Gas Limited[xv], where the CCI found Adani Gas Limited to have abused its dominant position in the Faridabad area, thereby illustrating the CCI’s adjudicatory role in assessing market dominance and anti-competitive conduct on the basis of evidence and reasoned analysis.
Way Forward
Critics claim that the Competition Commission of India integrates investigative and adjudicatory processes under a single institutional framework, creating issues about institutional bias.
Such an institutional system is said to cause structural bias, jeopardizing decisional neutrality. After forming a prima facie opinion, the Commission finds it impossible to preserve total neutrality at the last step. This calls into question the fundamental concept that the authority that begins or “prosecutes” a matter should not also adjudicate it. As consequence, this dual approach is viewed as contradictory with constitutional ideals, notably the notion of separation of powers.
Furthermore, problems about natural justice arise in this scenario. The concept of nemo judex in causa sua states that no individual or authority may be a judge in its own cause. Critics inquire whether a body that has formerly explicitly recorded a prima facie judgment of noncompliance can remain completely unbiased in evaluating the same evidence at the final level. This raises the potential of confirmation bias, in which the adjudicating authority is unconsciously motivated to reaffirm its initial findings.
Additionally, quorum-related issues have been reported. In other cases, members who heard oral arguments were either retired or were replaced before the final ruling was issued. As a result, final decisions were often signed by members who had not heard the parties in person, creating severe questions about procedural fairness.
These concerns were particularly expressed in the Mahindra Electric (2019) case[xvi], in which theconcept of audi alteram partem was considered to be jeopardised due to changes in theCommission’s membership throughout the proceedings. Such a procedural errors jeopardize the impartiality and integrity of the adjudication process.
In closing, while the Competition Commission of India is critical to ensuring market competition and economic discipline, its combined administrative and adjudicatory duties continue to face constitutional and procedural challenges. Addressing these challenges through greater institutional separation, stronger procedural protections, and consistent adjudicatory composition will improve the fairness and confidence in India’s competition law framework.
[i]THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
[ii]THE MONOPOLISTIC AND RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES (MRTP) ACT OF 1969
[iii]THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013
[iv]THE INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE, 2016
[v] THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
[vi]SECTION 26(1) OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
[vii] CCI v. SAIL (2010)10 SCC 744 (CIVIL APPEAL NO.7779 OF 2010)
[viii] SECTION 27 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
[ix]SECTION 19 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
[x]GOOGLE ANDROID CASE (2020–2023)Case No. 19 of 2020
[xi]BRAHM DUTT V. UNION OF INDIA (2005) 2 SCC 431(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 490 Of 2003)
[xii]BRAHM DUTT V. UNION OF INDIA (2005)2 SCC 431(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 490 Of 2003) JUDEGEMENT DATED ON 20-01-2005(PARAGRAPH 6, PAGE NO 3)
[xiii] HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED VS THE COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (COMPETITION APPEAL (AT) NO. 06 OF 2017)
[xiv]SECTION 3(4) OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
[xv] FARIDABAD INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION (FIA) V. M/S ADANI GAS LIMITED (CCI CASE NO. 71 OF 2012)
[xvi]MAHINDRA ELECTRIC MOBILITY LTD. & ANR. VS CCI & ANR (W.P.(C) 11467/2018)
Author Name- Vaishnavi and Naman, BALLB [1st year students ] at MAHARJA SURAJMAL INSTITUTE, GURU GOBIND SINGH INDRAPRASTHA UNIVERSITY
