Court: Supreme Court of India
Citation: (1995) 6 SCC 194; AIR 1996 SC 309; 1996 Cri LJ 381; JT 1995 (7) SC 299; 1995 Supp (4) SCR 237
Bench / Coram: Dr. A.S. Anand and M.K. Mukherjee, JJ.
Case Type: Criminal Appeal No. 1183 of 1995
Date of Judgment: 12 October 1995
Parties:
- Appellant: Rupan Deol Bajaj (I.A.S. Officer) and Anr.
- Respondent: Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (Director General of Police, Punjab) and Ors.
Introduction
Women across the globe have raised their voices against the injustice and indeed they have been heard. One such voice was raised by Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, an I.A.S officer, Punjab Cadre, against the highest ranking police officer Mr. K.P.S Gill for molestation one of the most criticized and recognized cases.
Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, an officer of the Indian Administrative Services (I.A.S.) member of the Punjab Cadre, employed as the Special Secretary Finance, complained with the Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh Union Territory.
The complaint was alleging the commission of offenses under Sections 341, 342, 352, 354, and 509 of the Indian Penal Code by Mr. K.P.S. Gill, the Director-General of Police, Punjab, towards her on 18 July 1988 at a dinner party.
The case gained much popularity in the media as the “butt slapping case.”
Facts Of The Case
- Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, was invited to a dinner party on 18th July, 1988 which was being organized by S.L. Kapoor, the Punjab Financial Commissioner. Mrs. Bajaj went to the party together with her husband Mr. B.R. Bajaj, a senior I.A.S. officer. Several invitees were at the party, including Mr. Gill.
- Around 10 PM on the said night, Dr. Chutani and Mr. Gill walked across the garden and sat in the ladies’ circle.
- Bajaj, who was talking to Mrs. Bijlani and Mrs. Bhandari at the time, was requested by Mr. Gill to take a seat next to him as he wanted to talk to her about something.
- Responding to his such request when Mrs. Bajaj went to sit in a chair next to him Mr. Gill suddenly pulled that chair close to his chair.
- Bajaj was a bit taken aback when she put that chair at its original place and was about to sit down and Mr. Gill again pulled his chair closer.
- Realising something was wrong she immediately left the place and went back to sit with the ladies.
- After about 10 minutes Shri Gill came and stood in front of her so close that his legs were about 4″ from her knees.
- He then, by an action with the crook of his finger asked her to “get up immediately” and come along with him.
- When she strongly objected to his behaviour and asked him to go away from there he repeated his earlier command which shocked the ladies present there.
- Being apprehensive and frightened she tried to leave the place but could not as he had blocked her way.
- Finding no other alternative when she drew her chair back and turned backwards, he slapped her on the posterior in the full presence of the ladies and guests.
- Mrs. Bajaj registered a complaint with the Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh, accusing Mr. Gill of offences under Sections 341, 342, 352, 354 and 509 of Indian Penal Code
Procedural Background
Following Mrs. Bajaj’s complaint, the Chandigarh Police registered an FIR at the Central Police Station and began an investigation. However, the investigation did not progress fairly, and no action was taken against Mr. Gill.
Consequently, on 22 November 1988, her husband, Mr. B.R. Bajaj, also an IAS officer, filed a separate complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, alleging the same offences. The case was then transferred to a Judicial Magistrate for hearing.
While the police investigation was still pending, Mr. Gill approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking to quash both the FIR and the complaint. The High Court issued an interim order staying the police investigation but allowed the complaint proceedings to continue.
During these proceedings, the complainant sought to summon two senior officers, Mr. Y.S. Ratra and Mr. J.F. Ribeiro, along with certain official documents. The State of Punjab objected, claiming privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, arguing that the documents related to affairs of the State. The Magistrate rejected this claim, holding that the documents were not privileged.
The State challenged this order through a Criminal Revision Petition, which the High Court allowed on 24 January 1989. Later, on 29 May 1989, the High Court also accepted Mr. Gill’s petition and quashed both the FIR and the complaint.
These two High Court orders were subsequently challenged before the Supreme Court of India by Mr. and Mrs. Bajaj, leading to the present appeal.
The above two orders of the High Court are under challenge in these appeals at the instance of Mr. and Mrs. Bajaj.
Issues Raised
- Whether the allegations constitute any of the offenses mentioned?
- Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR and complaint in the exercise of the power given under Article 226 of the Constitution?
Legal Provisions Involved
- Sections 95, 341, 342, 352, 354 and Section 509 of IPC.
- Section 157, 482 of Criminal Procedural Code, 1973 (Cr. P. C)
Arguments
Arguments raised by Petitioner
- In the present case, the first and foremost question which rose in front of the court was whether the allegations constitute any or all of the offences for which the case has been registered. The court firstly looked into the matter of Section 354 and Section 509 of IPC both of which relate to the modesty of women. The Court has referred various dictionaries for the purpose of figuring out the meaning of modesty since it is not defined in the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
- The learned counsel for the petitioners while advancing her argument stressed on the fact that Section 482 of Cr.P.C. which saves the inherent powers of the High Court does not include quashing of FIR in case of cognizable offences. They also raised contention that delay in filing the FIR cannot be a valid ground for quashing it as the reason for the delay was itself Stated in the FIR.
- The applicability of Section 95 IPC was highly criticized as outraging a woman’s modesty cannot be considered as a trivial matter.
Arguments raised by the Respondent
- The Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that, even if it is assumed that Mr. Gill outraged the modesty of Mrs. Bajaj, still it cannot be said that he has attracted the Section 354 of IPC because the other ingredient of the offence under the said Section is intention, which is clearly lacking in the present scenario. He urged that the culpable intention of the offender in committing the act is the crux of the matter and not the consequence thereof.
- The learned Additional Solicitor General for the respondent submitted that the reasons stated by the High Court for quashing the FIR was reasonable.
- It was also submitted by Mr. Tulsi in fairness that however, court is not in quashing F.I.R. on the ground of unusual delay in lodging F.I.R. But he was strongly contended that defence of S 95 is totally justifiable in the present case and its facts.
Judgement
While deciding the appeal, the Supreme Court analysed the two central issues—whether the allegations disclosed an offence, and whether the High Court was right in quashing the proceedings—as discussed below:
~Prime Facie allegations constitute offence~
The Supreme Court first examined whether the allegations in the FIR, if taken at face value, made out the commission of any offence under the Indian Penal Code. The Court focused primarily on Sections 354 and 509 IPC, which relate to outraging the modesty of a woman.
Relying on the earlier precedent in State of Punjab v. Major Singh (AIR 1967 SC 63), the Bench observed that any act done to or in the presence of a woman, which is suggestive of sex according to ordinary human standards, would fall within the ambit of Section 354 IPC. Applying this principle, the Court held that Mr. Gill’s act of slapping Mrs. Bajaj on her posterior, in public view, clearly amounted to an act outraging her modesty.
The Court further cited Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan (AIR 1966 SC 1773) while rejecting the respondent’s plea under Section 95 IPC , holding that no act which violates a woman’s dignity can ever be considered trivial.
The Court clarified that at the stage of determining whether a case should proceed to trial, it was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. The prosecution did not need to conclusively prove intent at this stage.
The Court also examined the allegations in relation to Sections 341, 342, and 352 IPC, holding that the facts did not indicate any element of wrongful restraint, confinement, or assault beyond the act already covered under Section 354. Likewise, the defence under Section 95 IPC (trivial acts) was rejected, with the Court firmly stating that no act violating a woman’s dignity can be considered trivial or excusable.
~High Court was not Justified in Quashing the FIR and Complaint~
The second issue concerned the scope of the High Court’s power under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court possesses inherent power to quash criminal proceedings, it must exercise this power sparingly and only in cases where the allegations are absurd, frivolous, or inherently improbable.
In the present case, the FIR and complaint disclosed clear prima facie offences, and the High Court had no authority to assess the truth or credibility of the evidence at this preliminary stage. By quashing both the FIR and the complaint, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted contrary to well-settled legal principles.
~Final Holding~
The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the High Court’s order, restored the FIR and the complaint, and directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, to take cognizance of the offences under Sections 354 and 509 IPC and proceed with the trial in accordance with law.
The Court emphasized that acts which outrage the modesty of women strike at the core of their dignity and social equality, and the justice system must not trivialize such offences merely because they are committed by persons in positions of power.
Comment
Famously known as the “butt-slapping case,” this judgment stands as a milestone in India’s gender justice jurisprudence. What began as an incident of public humiliation turned into a 17-year legal battle led by IAS officer Rupan Deol Bajaj, who fearlessly challenged the abuse of power by a top police official. Despite threats, social isolation, and professional backlash, she pursued justice to its logical end, symbolizing the courage of a woman standing alone against institutional power.
The case is remarkable for its progressive interpretation of Sections 354 and 509 IPC, provisions that had long remained dormant since 1860. The Supreme Court’s recognition that any act violating a woman’s dignity, even without explicit sexual intent, amounts to outraging her modesty marked a significant advancement in criminal law. The Court also affirmed that the victim’s own truthful testimony can suffice for conviction, reinforcing faith in women’s voices within the justice system.
Author Name- Ganga Ram Mittal, B.A. LL.B. (9th Semester) | University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh
